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The gradual crowding out of singleton and small team science by large team endeavors is challenging key
features of research culture. It is therefore important for the future of scientific practice to reflect upon the
individual scientist’s ethical responsibilities within teams. To facilitate this reflection we show labor force trends
in the US revealing a skewed growth in academic ranks and increased levels of competition for promotion within
the system; we analyze teaming trends across disciplines and national borders demonstrating why it is becoming
difficult to distribute credit and to avoid conflicts of interest; and we use more than a century of Nobel prize data
to show how science is outgrowing its old institutions of singleton awards. Of particular concern within the large
team environment is the weakening of the mentor-mentee relation, which undermines the cultivation of virtue
ethics across scientific generations. These trends and emerging organizational complexities call for a universal
set of behavioral norms that transcend team heterogeneity and hierarchy. To this end, our expository analysis
provides a survey of ethical issues in team settings to inform science ethics education and science policy.
Many of science’s grand challenges have become too daunt-
ing for individual investigators to undertake. The increase in
the characteristic size and complexity of teams reflects the di-
vision of labor that is necessary in large projects. As a result,
team science is now more prevalent than individual science, a
shift that has occurred slowly but steadily over the last century
[1, 2].
The range in the size of scientific endeavors spans three or-
ders of magnitude, from singleton to “Big Science” programs
in excess of 1000 members [3]. Large-scale multi-disciplinary
projects, requiring extensive resources, have become increas-
ingly common. Examples include the Higgs particle exper-
iment at CERN, the big data genomics project by the EN-
CODE consortium [4], cross-institutional medical trials [5],
and large scale digital humanities projects such as the Google
Inc. n-gram portal [6]. A better understanding of team science
is important for the economics of science [7–9], the manage-
ment of science [1, 10, 11], the evaluation of scientific careers
[12–14], and the internationalization of science [15, 16].
An open discussion focused on ethical issues germane to
team science is also important for the future of scientific re-
search, which ultimately depends on the quality of individual
contributions. In the academic domain, production of public
knowledge is based upon priority, a type of credit that incen-
tivizes scientists to share, reuse, and build upon the knowledge
stock [7–9]. Two key features of this credit system are that
the priority be clearly assignable and the credit be transpar-
ently divisible among coauthors. However, with increasing
team size, typically accompanied by a hierarchical manage-
ment structure, it has become difficult to monitor and evaluate
individual efforts towards team objectives, rendering a fair di-
vision of credit challenging [17].
Here we take a quantitative historical approach [18] to ini-
tiate discourse on a class of ethical considerations that have
emerged with team science and are in contradistinction to eth-
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ical guidelines in singleton science [19, 20]. These considera-
tions are inherently complex because they span multiple levels
of context, from the individual, to the team, and even up to the
international level.
In what follows, we start in the Results section with empir-
ical evidence that provides reference points in the Discussion
section. Specifically, we start by analyzing diverse data
sources to document the skewed growth of the scientific labor
force, the growth of team size in science, the implications
of large team size on hierarchy and transparency, the limits
of individual achievement awards, such as the Nobel Prize,
and the internationalization of scientific collaboration net-
works. We then draw upon these quantitative illustrations
in our discussion of six ethics issues in team science: (i)
the ethics of credit; (ii) the ethics of coauthorship; (iii) the
ethical dilemmas associated with conflict of interest; (iv) the
attenuation of the mentor-mentee relationship and the threat it
poses to virtue ethics; (v) the ethical dilemmas manifesting in
cross-border collaboration; and (vi) the universality of norms.
Results
Skewed Growth of the Scientific Labor Force. The growth
of science is readily illustrated by the numbers of faculty
members and faculty-in-training. In the United States (US),
a country with an established public funding system, this
growth is largely driven by federal funding initiatives. As a
result, the scientific endeavor, in particular the scientific la-
bor force, is sensitive to sudden policy shifts, such as the NIH
budget doubling that occurred over the 5-year period 1998-
2003, the 2009 federal stimulus plan, and the subsequent 2013
budget sequestration in the US [8, 24–26]. Other countries
are also susceptible to volatile funding, as was the case with
austerity measures in European countries following the recent
global recession.
To illustrate the growth of the scientific population we have
2FIG. 1: Growth of the scientific labor force. (A) The annual numbers of graduate students and postdoctorates in US Science & Engineering
departments [21]. (B,C,D) The annual numbers of US postdoc and faculty positions by degree field [22]. (E,F) The annual percentages of
doctorate holders by group (faculty vs. postdocs) and their ratios in US universities. Data was aggregated over two distinct age cohorts: careers
with 1-3 years (early) and 4-7 years (mid) since doctorate [23]. The disproportionate growth rates between the faculty and postdoc positions
may pose a threat to the mentor-mentee relationship.
analyzed the number of US graduate students, postdoctoral
fellows, and faculty members over a 40-year span for the nat-
ural and health sciences [21–23]. Fig. 1A shows that the num-
ber of NSF and NIH funded graduate students and postdocs is
growing at roughy 2.2% and 3.7% annual rate, respectively.
For comparison, these growth rates are slightly larger than the
growth rates of the global population over the same period,
which according to the US Census Bureau is between 1% to
2% [27]. Fig. 1(B-D) show the growth in the size S(t) of
the postdoctoral and faculty population in six fields, with re-
spect to the base year 1973. When disaggregated by field,
the growth in the academic population no longer exhibits a
smooth trend, as in Fig. 1A, but instead reflects the nuances
of federal steering. Notably, the scale of the growth factor is
significantly larger for the postdocs than for the tenure-track
faculty, reflecting the formation of a bottleneck in the career
pipeline [8, 28, 29]. Indeed, Figs. 1E and 1F show how the
overall ratio of faculty to postdocs, an indicator of promotion
likelihood, has significantly decreased over the last 40 years.
These trends reflect the ways in which the academic profes-
sion is growing. The embedding of scientists into large teams
is a corollary of this growth. Little is known about how these
trends are impacting the levels of competition and career sus-
tainability, but there are signs of potential problems [25, 30].
In particular, as we shall demonstrate in the next section, the
new entrants into the scientific community swell the number
and size of teams. As a result, the important mentor-mentee
relation may be at risk; in addition to the ethical conflicts that
arise when a mentor has more than one mentee [31], mentors
have less time per mentee due to time constraints. This
unbalancing trend in the mentor-to-mentee ratio may nega-
tively impact the graduate training experience by reducing
the opportunities for mentors to offer psychosocial help [32]
and to develop strategies to decrease undesirable behavior
[33]. Furthermore, it may adversely affect a broad range of
mentoring outcomes [34, 35], including the development of
academic identity and academic expectations [36], and in
general, the cross-generational cultivation of values.
3FIG. 2: Expansion of the team-size distribution. The observed frequency P (≥ a) of papers or patents with team size of at least size a. The
plots are shown on log-log axes, where each colored curve corresponds to a non-overlapping 5-year period indicated in the legend. The broad
distribution of a values for each journal demonstrates that the credit for a single publication can be distributed across a far-ranging number of
contributors, whereas for patents, the typical team size and its spread are considerably smaller.
Team size growth. As the complexity of research projects
increases, collaboration within teams becomes a key feature
of the science system. To illustrate the steady growth of team
sizes, we have undertaken a historical analysis of coauthorship
in scientific publications and coinventorship in patents. The
public domain teams recorded in scientific publications vs. the
private domain teams captured by patent applications offer a
comparative perspective on the role of teams in R&D during
the last half-century.
Specifically, we analyzed coauthorship patterns in four
Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge (WOK) publication
datasets: (i) the biology journal Cell, (ii) an agglomeration
of 14 high-impact economics journals, (iii) the New England
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), and (iv) the Physical Review
Letters (PRL). These journals represent four distinct research
domains, chosen to demonstrate that the pattern of exponen-
tial growth is common across the datasets analyzed. The
discipline-specific growth rates likely reflect the differences
in the production of knowledge within each discipline. We
refer the curious reader to [1] for a broader subfield analysis,
which includes Arts & Humanities, and it also discusses the
relative citation impact premium attributable to teams.
In each dataset summarized in Table 1 we count for each
publication or patent the number a of coauthors (coinventors),
a measure that is a proxy for team size. To identify the evo-
lution of coauthorship (coinventorship) patterns, we separated
the data into non-overlapping periods and calculated the com-
plementary cumulative distribution P≥(a) for each dataset.
To put it another way, the value 100 × P≥(a) indicates the
percentage of papers (patents) that have at least a coauthors
(coinventors).
Fig. 2 illustrates the evolution of P≥(a) for all six data
sets. Please note that the range is long, spanning from unity
4FIG. 3: Persistent growth of team size and the increasing dilemma of sharing credit. (A) For each 5-year period we plot the mean of the
distribution 〈a〉 and the standard deviation σa, and report the annual growth rate τ calculated for 〈a(t)〉. Years listed are the start year for each
of the 5-year non-overlapping periods. (B) There is an increasing complexity with team size; a denotes the number of team members (nodes),
N the number of “associations” (links), and so the ratio T ≡ a/N is a simple measure for the transparency of the team’s activities.
(100) to more than 1000 (103) on the x-axis (showing team
size) and from unity to 1 part per million (10−6) on the y-
axis (showing frequency). Hence, we use base-10 logarithmic
scale to express the entire range. The key characteristic of
these distributions is the persistent shifting towards larger a
values over time, indicating the increasing frequency of large
teams. This shifting is becoming increasingly right-skewed,
having a distinct “extremely large team” component class that
is emerging in the right tail (evident in the NEJM, PRL, EPO,
and PCT datasets for a > 50).
Fig. 3A shows the growth of the distribution mean 〈a〉
and standard deviation σa for each time interval. Note that
the time-period color legends are consistent across all pan-
els in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3A, facilitating comparisons. From
each time series 〈aj(t)〉 we estimated the exponential growth
rate τj for dataset j, using ordinary least squares regression of
log〈aj(t)〉. Fig. 3A depicts persistent long-term exponential
trends for 〈aj(t)〉, quantified by annual growth rates τj in the
range of 0.011 - 0.045 (see Table 1).
It remains to be determined how much of the growth in team
size is produced by social versus technological change, and
whether the variation in τj across disciplines reflects specific
socio-economic factors such as size, subfield population com-
position and population growth, or idiosyncratic publication
and funding norms [1]. Furthermore, it is unclear if the recent
shift represents a transient reorganization from one regime to
another, or if the trend will continue to persist long-term. It
is also worth noting that the distribution of team size does not
necessarily depend on the sustained growth of scientific pro-
duction, but instead reflects the relative prevalence of large
teams with respect to small teams across a widening range.
To illustrate this point, consider the medical journal NEJM,
for which there has been a dramatic decrease in the fraction
of publications that have a single author - from 21% in 1958-
1962 to 7% in 2008-2012. Redistributing this 14% difference
in the frequency of singleton publications, across the entire
range of the NEJM distribution, and taking into account that
large clinical trial publications can have in excess of 700 coau-
thors, accounts for a significant portion of the growth in 〈aj〉.
Despite these caveats, given these relatively stable trends, it
is tempting to make a crude forecast for the next generation of
scientists. If we take the growth trend observed for the journal
Cell over the past 35 years (representing a career length), and
extrapolate the trend over the next 35 years to 2050, we predict
the mean team size 〈a(2050)〉 to be approximately 34 coau-
thors per paper. A similar extrapolation for the EPO growth
trend suggests that by 2050 the mean patent will have approx-
imately 4.2 coinventors; for comparison, this is the same as
the mean coauthorship for Cell in 1988. For PRL and NEJM
the predictions for 〈a(2050)〉 are significantly greater, being
105 and 74 coauthors, respectively. Overall, these basic trends
demonstrate the systemic shifts arising from slow but steady
exponential growth in the course of one generation. While it is
unrealistic to expect these trends to extend indefinitely, there
remains plenty of room for team size growth, especially con-
sidering that the distributions of team size are heavily right-
5skewed and so the mean can be dramatically affected by just a
few extreme events. For example, consider the new opportuni-
ties in science provided by the ability to obtain crowdsourced
research input across the entire population. As such, the up-
per limit to the number of participants in a research project
may be bounded only by the human population size, as it is
evidenced in a recent open laboratory project with roughly
37,000 acknowledged participants [37].
Interestingly, for the medicine and physics journals ana-
lyzed here, there is a crossover period, where the standard de-
viation (measuring the characteristic deviation from the mean
value) becomes greater than the mean value, σa(t) > 〈a(t)〉.
This “tipping point” marks the entrenchment of large team
science in these disciplines [3]. In the PRL data this crossover
occurred in the 1970s, whereas for NEJM this occurred in the
1990s. It is well documented that large team endeavors have
existed in physics since the Manhattan project [38]. Our quan-
titative analysis points to similar shifts in medicine related to
large clinical trials [5]. Recently, this pattern has been spread-
ing to biology due to large genome projects such as ENCODE
[4]. The “large team science” feature has not yet appeared in
either the economics or the patent datasets, although one is
left to speculate that it is only a matter of time as long as the
right incentives to collaborate are present.2
Hierarchy and transparency in large teams. The growth
in characteristic team size persists over time for each dataset
analyzed, and largely reflects the increasing complexity of sci-
entific endeavors. This increasing complexity is also manifest
in the organization of scientific teams. Ideally, team leaders
efficiently implement a division of labor according to various
levels of specialization, so that resources are optimally uti-
lized within the team.
The schematic in Fig. 3B demonstrates how the over-
whelming number of dependencies between team members in
large teams calls for a modular management strategy, which is
effected by a hierarchical distinction between team members.
Indeed, the maximum number of (undirected) dependencies
N in a team of size a is given by N = a(a − 1)/2. These
dependencies (links) represent the multitude of associations
between team members. In line with common intuition, the
[2] It is important to note that the intellectual property rights associated with
a patent are also shared across all a coapplicants (coinventors and/or coas-
signees). Because patenting is based upon proof-of-principle and not nec-
essarily implementation, the commercial rights only need belong to the
person(s) who originated the idea. Furthermore, due to the possibility of
direct financial benefits attached to the patent rights, there is a tendency to
keep coapplicant lists from reaching extreme sizes. Since only the idea is
necessary, and prospects of large financial reward are understood, indus-
tries encourage patenting ideas almost as quickly as they are generated.
And, because most ideas are never implemented, there is little incentive
to include people with potential downstream contributions (e.g., those who
eventually would implement the idea and/or test it). These reasons account
for the significantly smaller team sizes and growth rates in patents with re-
spect to scientific publications. Nevertheless, recent policies in companies
and academic and government institutions requiring the pre-assignment of
an employee’s future intellectual property to the employer may be respon-
sible for a systematic shift away from single-applicant patents.
ability of any given team member to monitor all aspects of the
team’s operations – i.e., the “transparency” of the operation –
decreases as the mean number of links per person in the team,
〈k〉 = 2N/a, increases. Hence, for highly connected team
networks, the transparency T ≡ a/N decreases significantly
with increasing a, reaching a minimum value T0 = 2/(a− 1)
for a completely interdependent team.
Fig. 3B illustrates how the team structure positively affects
transparency. By going from team (i) to team (ii) where the
team size increases from 3 to 10, the transparency value de-
creases by a factor of 5, going from 1 to 0.2. However, a mod-
ular team structure, as demonstrated in team (iii), can over-
come the transparency reduction problem. In this case, even
though the team size increases by a factor of 3 from team (ii)
to team (iii), the transparency value a/N remains the same.
Introducing this organizational complexity, however, means
that three team members (red) are distinguished from the other
team members, forming a leadership hierarchy.
The larger implications of the transparency problem are that
for large teams it is difficult ex post facto to allocate credit
[17], to assign blame, to justify inclusion or exclusion from
coauthor lists, to disentangle conflicts of interest, and from a
practical perspective, to maintain team efficiency [12].
These basic conjectures are consistent with recent research
on team formation aimed at explaining why some teams far
outperform other teams [39]. This research indicates that three
team member properties - energy, engagement, and explo-
ration - are crucial factors underlying successful teams. It is
also found that structural features, such as hierarchical “teams
within teams”, can reduce the cohesive engagement among
less active team members. Hence, in order to overcome this
negative feature of hierarchy, as well as to overcome the trans-
parency problem so that members are aware of each other’s
contributions, teams must actively focus on high levels of en-
gagement.
In science, the fair allocation of credit is especially relevant
in the context of lifetime achievements, which come in
the form of career awards and membership in prestigious
academic societies. The problem is that career awards such
as the Nobel prize, which are limited to a maximum of 3
recipients per award, can significantly disregard the success
that is attributable to collaboration. Indeed, it is becoming
evident in the Nobel prize award cardinality patterns that
the institutions of singleton awards are reaching their limits.
Fig. 4 shows the number of recipients per Nobel prize award
for each of the four science categories [40]. To provide a
crude estimate of recent growth rates for comparison, we
estimated an exponential growth trend using the 10-year
mean calculated within non-overlapping 10-year periods.
The growth trends suggest that an amendment to the 3-person
cap on the number of recipients per award should be made
for both the “Physiology or Medicine” and “Physics” prizes,
which appear to be outgrowing the upper limit established in
the era of singleton science. This example serves as additional
evidence that the incentive system in science is not adapting
to the systemic shifts that have occurred alongside the basic
growth of the scientific industry.
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FIG. 4: Increasing cardinality of the Nobel Prize. The number of Nobel prize recipients per award (black data), averaged over each decade
(blue data), shows steady growth (dashed red curve is the exponential fit of 10-year mean with growth rate τ indicated in each panel). We
provide the estimated growth rate purely as a comparative value between disciplines without implying that the cardinality of the Nobel prize
will continue to grow.
Internationalization of scientific networks. The internation-
alization of global R&D reflects the drive to produce high
quality output through optimal combination of experts, inde-
pendent of locality. Trends in cross-border collaboration in-
tensity can indicate the role of distance and geopolitics, fac-
tors of great relevance for the integration of interdependent
innovation systems, e.g., within the European Research Area
[15]. Scientific publication data provides a good proxy for
cross-border activities, yielding insights into various collabo-
ration network properties and the relation between a country’s
international collaboration intensity, spending per researcher,
and the mean citation impact per paper [16].
While the number of publications has been growing
steadily, in large and small R&D systems alike, it is not well
understood at which rate smaller countries are joining the net-
work of established R&D systems. To illustrate this integra-
tion process, we analyzed a NSF database of 264,431 Science
& Engineering publications sampled from the years 1995 and
2010 [41]. From the counts of the total number of publica-
tions Mij coauthored by country i and j, we define the rela-
tive share of country j in the collaboration portfolio of coun-
try i in year t as Sij(t) ≡ Mij(t)/
∑
iMij(t). The relative
integration index gij(t,∆t) ≡ log[Sij(t)/Sij(t − ∆t)] =
log[Sij(t)] − log[Sij(t − ∆t)] measures the relative growth
of county j within the portfolio of country i over a given time
period ∆t. The natural logarithm is used so that Sij(t) reflects
a relative (percent) change over time, since the value Mij(t)
can vary dramatically across the set of countries analyzed.
Fig. 5A shows the 15-year growth matrix gij for the top
38 internationally collaborating countries in 2010, where the
countries are listed in decreasing order of total publications
Ai(2010). The mean value 〈g〉j = 38−1
∑
i gij of a given
country, shown in the bottom row of the relative integration
matrix, indicates how much the country is integrating glob-
ally; green shading corresponds to positive growth while red
shading corresponds to negative growth. The leaders over
the 15-year period are Singapore (SN), Iran (IR) and China
(CH). In contrast, Russia (RS) stands out as the only country
with a negative mean integration rate (see the Methods section
for a full list of country names). The overall trend is for the
countries with smaller Ai (countries further to the right in the
growth matrix) to have the largest integration rates, indicating
their recent entry into the global R&D economy.
Since the relative integration matrix represents the integra-
tion between country pairs, it is also insightful to visualize the
systemic correlations that are contained in the network topol-
ogy. Of particular interest in the context of our analysis are
the sparsely distributed gij values that are significantly posi-
tive (dark green), which likely represent new country-country
links. In order to visualize the network defined by these rel-
atively large gij values, Fig. 5B shows the integration matrix
after we eliminate all values with gij < 1.34. We choose the
7FIG. 5: Visualizing cross-border collaboration growth. (A) The relative integration matrix gij measures how much a country in column
j has increased (green) or decreased (red) its collaboration in scientific publications with the other countries (row i). The final row indicates
the mean value of gij for each column. China (CN) stands out as a large producer of scientific publications, which has also increased its
collaboration share with almost every country shown. (B) By eliminating (pruning) all matrix values with gij < 1.34 we obtain the minimal
spanning cluster. (C) Network representation of the minimum spanning cluster; nodes are countries colored by region with size proportional
to logAi(2010), and links have thickness and shading proportional to gij(1995− 2010).
pruning threshold gc ≡ 1.34 because this is the largest value
for which all nodes (countries) in the network are still con-
nected within a single network. In the network science termi-
nology, this minimal set of links that connects the entire sys-
tem defines what is called the “giant spanning cluster”3. Fig.
5C illustrates the giant spanning cluster network and high-
lights the role of incoming partners on the globalization of sci-
[3] Interestingly, the United States is the first country to be eliminated from the
giant spanning cluster network for gc > 1.34. This feature follows from
the fact that the US has long been a collaboration hub, having already a
largeMij(1995) for all the countries shown. Hence, the percent growth of
counties within the US portfolio is relatively small due to upper limits in the
amount that collaboration can increase. Nevertheless, China, Singapore,
Turkey, and Iran show signs of significant integration with US research
over the 15 year period.
ence. The global integration hubs Iran (IR), Singapore (SN),
Turkey (TU), China (CN), and South Korea (KS) are char-
acterized by the disproportionate number of integration links
connecting them to countries from every other geographic re-
gion represented in the data.
Hence, how does globalization affect issues of team ethics?
While it is straightforward to argue that the integration of the
global R&D economy is good for both science and society,
in the following discussion we highlight practical dilemmas
arising from significant differences between the social norms
and ethical boundaries framing scientific activities in differ-
ent countries. We argue that as countries with different eco-
nomic levels, language, governance, laws, and cultural team-
work norms, continue to integrate their R&D programs, it will
become increasingly difficult to disentangle subjective ethical
considerations. As a result, we predict that ethical conflicts of
this type will become increasingly prevalent.
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Here we address the intersection of our quantitative analy-
ses with broad themes pertaining to team science ethics. The
persistent trends in the skewed growth of the scientific labor
force, the increasing organizational complexity arising from
increasing team sizes, and the global increase in the intensity
of cross-border collaboration activities, have consequences
for at least six issues of ethics outlined below:
1. Ethics of credit: Who to reward and who to blame?
The assignment of credit is fundamental to the reward scheme
in science [7–9]. The basic staple of the science credit system
is the credit associated with a publication. This is supposed
to be shared across all a coauthors independent of their rank.
The problem is that large teams in science have a pyramidal
structure, with the scientists who masterminded the project
and obtained the funding at the top. These project leaders reap
co-authorship gains from the entire hierarchy below them. For
example, it is not uncommon for directors of large particle
physics laboratories to publish upwards of 50 papers in a good
year. Hence, due to the nonlinearity of the underlying hierar-
chy and the broad range of team sizes in science (Fig. 2), even
fractionally distributing publication and citation counts could
introduce unfair bias.
In another hierarchical corps, the military, a scheme of bat-
tle badges evolved in order to distribute credit among the team
members contributing towards large scale goals. The science
corps has developed a similar system of allocating special
“badges” to the first author and the corresponding author; the
latter typically being the principal investigator who led the
project. However, variations in the norms of determining au-
thorship order do exist across disciplines.4
Recently, the methods for distinction have begun to change
in prestigious journals, allowing authors to designate their par-
ticular roles, e.g., designed research, performed research, con-
tributed new reagents/analytic tools, analyzed data, or wrote
the paper. This shift reflects the need for scientists within
teams to distinguish themselves [17]. Being associated by
name with a seminal paper can be a major career boost, espe-
cially for the first and corresponding authors. Yet, as the team
size increases, possibly across multiple groups and hence
across multiple principal investigators, a great difficulty in se-
lecting first and corresponding authors arises [42]. One reso-
lution to the problem is the practice of multiple publications,
whereby several variations of the same paper are submitted
to various conferences and journals with permuted author list
orderings [43]. This practice, however, contradicts the system
of precedence and is considered in some disciplines as ethical
[4] In the natural sciences, the first and corresponding author(s) are typically
distinguished from other coauthors. In economics alphabetical ordering
of the coauthor list is often the norm, thus eliminating special credit for
the lead author and principal investigator. Furthermore, in economics it
is common that graduate student data collectors and data cleaners are not
included in the coauthor list and only acknowledged in a footnote.
misconduct.
The problem of credit attribution among coauthors is not
new. Historically, even in the case of small teams, some-
times the contributions of junior scientists are unfairly allo-
cated to the senior scientist. However, the possibility of unfair
reward increases with team size for two main reasons. First,
because it becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate ef-
forts of the individual participants as demonstrated in our dis-
cussion of the team transparency T . And second, because it
becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate who should and
who should not be included as a coauthor. While there have
been recent efforts to develop quantitative methods that fac-
tor in team size in allocating publication and citation counts
[14, 44], accounting for variations in team organization and
specialization remains a core issue in the fair distribution of
scientific credit.
The former considerations address scenarios where science
goes well. The converse scenario raises the issue of who to
blame when science goes wrong. Questionable tactics pervade
everyday scientific practice, including several that are particu-
larly relevant to team settings, such as failing to acknowledge
credit for research ideas, misallocation of authorship credit,
multiple publications, and non-disclosure of conflicts of in-
terest [45]. Retraction of scientific papers is quite common,
with roughly 2/3 of retracted papers related to misconduct
[46]. Not all coauthors, however, may agree with the retrac-
tion, which further complicates matters. By way of example,
recent claims of faster-than-light neutrinos in a large team set-
ting resulted in a subsequent retraction. However, a fraction
of the team including the principal investigator insisted on the
validity of the finding despite mounting evidence that the ini-
tial results were flawed by experimental error. In the case of
retraction due to experimental error it may be difficult to trace
the blame to any single individual. In the case of retraction
due to fraud (for example, the Woo Suk Hwang controversy)
the blame may be entirely attributable to the principal inves-
tigator whose individual actions can compromise the efforts,
reputation, time, and careers of each team member [47, 48].
Beyond the scientist’s responsibility towards her/his team,
lies the scientist’s responsibility towards society. It was in
the early 20th century when certain risks to humanity from
scientific progress became evident and moral questions about
the role of individual scientists were raised. Such was the
case of Fritz Haber (Nobel Prize in Chemistry, 1917), who
discovered a method to synthesize ammonia with applications
in fertilizers and chemical bombs. By the mid 20th century,
Oppenheimer became the tragic figurehead of the Manhattan
project, which epitomizes the dilemma associated with the
moral responsibility of individual scientists embedded in
larger socio-political programs. With increasing numbers of
large projects faced with ethical dilemmas, and with many of
these projects having multiple figureheads and a hierarchical
structure that tends to cloud the channels of responsibility
[49], paradoxically moral responsibility has been shifting
towards the scientific commons.
2. Parasitic authorship.
In a large team setting, it is difficult not only to determine
9coauthor order, but also to determine who merits inclusion in
the coauthor list. After all, the addition of a single coauthor,
from a → a + 1, appears to be only a marginal modifica-
tion when a is large. Some senior researchers take advan-
tage of this coauthorship culture by exploiting uncertainties
or ambiguities in research guidelines and thus prospering in
poorly regulated, grey areas [50]. To limit this problem, scien-
tific institutions need to better define and impose ethical codes
for authorship credit, materially discouraging free-riding and
other corrupt authorship practices, such as bartering for coau-
thorship [51].
The central question is what constitutes coauthorship?
The criteria differ among disciplines and may be journal
dependent. Even within a given community, there may
not be consensus on the criteria that constitute significant
contributions meriting coauthorship [50]. By way of example,
with English becoming the de facto language for science,
many international teams must include members solely for
the purpose of helping and reviewing in the writing process
[52]. But does this constitute authorship, or does it fall under
the category of support? Many would argue that in the case
of support, the contribution should only be mentioned in the
acknowledgement section of the manuscript. But is this a fair
way of rewarding a crucial feature of scientific discourse and
refinement [53]?
3. Conflict of interest.
Many ethical dilemmas in science arise from a conflict of
interest that may emerge between individual scientists but
can also be made manifest between the scientist and the
greater scientific community. For example, self-interest and
favoritism are known to undermine the publication review
process, which relies on individuals to treat each other fairly,
sometimes in light of undisclosed competing interests. For
this reason it is widely accepted that previous coauthors or
mentor-mentee pairs should not be allowed to review each
other’s manuscripts [54]. It has also been proposed that men-
tors with more than one mentee are implicitly incapable of
meeting the ethical obligations of a mentor [31]. Such con-
flicts of interest between individuals become more likely as
team sizes grow and the interconnections in the “invisible
college” become unavoidable. Furthermore, as the scientific
enterprise expands and competition for limited resources in-
creases (sometimes even within the same team) the risk-to-
return tradeoff may incentivize unethical success strategies.
In this respect, a conflict of interest between the scientist and
the scientific commons emerges, whereby bad behavior may
evolve as individuals reconsider their identity and responsibil-
ities within the scientific system [45, 49, 55–57].
The level of competition in science can be readily illus-
trated by considering the number of successful NIH R01
grants and grant-holders relative to the number of submissions
and the total size of the applicant pool. Along those lines, a
recent news focus in the journal Science puts into perspective
the decreasing total NIH budget from 2003 - 2014 and how it
has impacted various actors in biomedical science [30]. Their
numbers show that the NIH budget decreased from its peak
at roughly 22 billion USD in 2003 to 17 billion USD in 2014
(values deflated to 1998 USD); meanwhile, the success rate of
R01 grants has halved while the number of funded5 principal
investigators has increased by 5% from 2000 to 2013. The re-
port goes on to show that the average scientist’s age at the time
of his/her first R01 grant has increased from 36 in 1980 to 42
in 2013, and likewise, that that the percentage of principal in-
vestigators over 65 has increased from 3.5% in 2000 to 7% in
2010. Aside from the unsustainable generational economics
of science, these trends also indicate that the young scientists
are assuming a disproportionate amount of the financial bur-
den, likely due to the granting system and other features of
science careers, which are based upon the principles of cumu-
lative advantage.
In a system where less funding must support a growing pop-
ulation of scientists, one quick solution is to fund teams in-
stead of individuals, a step up from the Howard Hughes Med-
ical Institute’s (HHMI) mission to fund “people not projects”.
For the moment, there is tension between the de-facto tenure
requirement in biomedical departments that an assistant pro-
fessor must obtain an R01 grant and the grant competition lev-
els that render this prospect a statistical impossibility, even for
stellar young scholars. To address this problem, funding needs
to be increased, the number of scientists in the pipeline needs
to decrease [25], and specific to the case for tenure, the crite-
ria for research scholarship need to be adjusted to better reflect
contributions in team settings.
The categories for documenting teaching, research, and ser-
vice activities in the tenure process (see [58] pp. 49–52) are
numerous and can vary from institute to institute. The docu-
mentation of teaching activities is more transparent, as teach-
ing hours and student evaluations of the candidate are rela-
tively easy to evaluate ex post facto. However, determining
an individual’s contribution to research scholarship in an ex
post facto evaluation can be extremely difficult if the output
of journals, books, grants, patents and presentations are com-
plicated by a variable and non-negligible team size. More-
over, while it is important not to discount the value of au-
thorship in multiple-author research products, so that tenure
productivity criteria aren’t biased against team-oriented sci-
entists, it is also important not to discount the value of inves-
tigator status in Multiple Principal Investigator (multi-PD/PI)
grants. Concerning the service component of tenure criteria,
there is a growing consensus calling for the acknowledgement
of patenting and other commercially valuable activities, which
have a “community service” component [59].
4. Mentor-mentee ethics.
The incentives to publish (or not publish) for a young scien-
tist are different than those of an established scientist. For
example, what happens in the case that a mentee’s findings
[5] These numbers reflect the number of funded individuals, and thus do not
account for the unfunded population. By inverting the success rates we
can estimate that the unfunded population has increased by 22% over the
same period. This scenario is further exacerbated by the fact that a small
number of principal investigators (6% of senior scientists) receive a dis-
proportionate amount of the annual funding (28%) provided through NIH
grants [30].
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are in disagreement with the previously published findings
of the mentor? Further mentor-mentee issues may arise in
large teams where the ratio of mentors to mentees is small
(as shown in Fig. 1). In these cases, the mentor may be un-
able to guide each student or postdoc individually due to time
constraints. As a result, the benefits of mentorship become di-
luted with negative implications for academic character build-
ing which is the basis of virtue ethics [49].
An additional issue that tests the mentor-mentee rela-
tionship is the narrowing bottleneck in academia [28, 55],
whereby an increasing number of Ph.D.s and postdocs are
being churned by large multi-institutional project grants that
likely have a weak impact on the number of new tenure-track
openings. As the prospects of climbing the career ladder
in Academia are often overstated, with the career outcomes
traditionally being poorly documented [8, 60], many young
scientists have likely been “lured” into postdoctoral traps
within large projects. This raises the question: Are the next
crop of scientists trained to be leaders or to just fit into a large
production line? And once they enter the tenure track, do the
lessons they learned in their ascent reflect positive scientific
values? Or do they reflect a system engaged in productivity
at the expense of quality, the choice of conservative research
projects over innovative risk-taking ones, and pathologically
competitive attitudes that run counter to socially beneficial
progress [56, 61, 62]?
5. International variations in ethics codes.
The norms of leadership, management, and promotion can be
largely country dependent [13]. Moreover, the norms for eth-
ical conduct in science [63] and the laws reflecting bioethical
standards on research topics involving stem cells [64], exper-
iments with animals, and human clinical trials, can also vary
significantly across counties [65].
For example, the localization of proprietary biomedical
R&D in countries with less restrictive stem-cell bioethics leg-
islature [66, 67] reflects how these variations across countries
have entered into corporate strategy. While it may be in vio-
lation of local ethics codes and legislature to work on specific
types of stem cells in one country, should it also be in violation
to collaborate with partners in another country that does allow
the controversial stem cell line? To give a specific example,
the outsourcing of clinical trials to poor regions of India has
become a popular method of side-stepping local ethical and
economic impediments [68, 69].
Fig. 5 shows that in the era of large team science, more
collaborations are crossing national borders involving devel-
oping economies and possibly third world poverty. Adhering
to local ethics codes in a global system is important for the
building of character and identity. To facilitate the decision
making process when international teams encounter conflicts
in local ethics codes, the global standardization of ethical
norms is crucial [70, 71].
6. Universality of norms.
We have already mentioned how international standards can
vary significantly. Another relevant question is whether we
should expect for the ethics of small team science to map
across scale and apply unflinchingly to large team science.
Several features of large team science challenge the institu-
tions constructed for small team science, namely the repro-
ducibility of such large projects (inherently requiring comple-
mentary large teams committed to verification), and the dis-
tribution of credit to all participants. Finally, increasing team
size is also accompanied by the growth of interdisciplinary
science: Is it possible to expect that social norms of ethical
publication conduct be shared across disciplines?
Conclusion
We have used quantitative analysis to document trends in
scientific operations that bear ethical ramifications and call
for introspection and open discussion. Over time these trends
will affect an increasing fraction of scientists, whose careers
will depend on team activity. Even within the social sciences,
where historically team sizes have been small, the trends re-
veal slow but persistent growth. For example, our analysis
indicates that by the year 2050 the mean publication team size
in economics will be 〈a(2050)〉 ≈ 3.5 coauthors, which is
comparable to the mean publication team size in cell biology
during the 1980s and in physics during the 1970s. Moreover,
in the next 35 years – typifying a scientific generation – we
also project that 5% of the teams will be greater than 100
coauthors in physics and greater than 50 coauthors in cell bi-
ology. Hence, the ethics issues we have outlined will become
increasingly pressing.
The first issue raised is how persistent growth in team size
poses a challenge to the longstanding credit system in sci-
ence, and calls into question the appropriateness of singular
achievement awards in team settings. In our discussion, a
theme has developed around the heterogeneity of the actors
in scientific teams and the distinct role of team leaders who
often gain a disproportionate share of credit. When this credit
bias is coupled with limited upward mobility in the research
career ladder, it creates a state of “haves and have-nots” that
tests scientists’ attitudes and behaviors [45].
Concerning unethical behavior, further research is needed
to investigate how to incentivize cooperation and ethical prac-
tice in the team environment, likely calling for new team
ethics paradigms. Sanctioning bad behavior in a team en-
vironment has benefits, as there is recent evidence that the
role of organizational (in)justice, and perceptions thereof, can
have an impact on a scientist’s identity within the scientific
system, and can affect his/her propensity to behave or mis-
behave [72, 73]. Furthermore, evidence from organizational
game theory suggests that policies that punish unethical be-
havior should be widely adopted, since institutions with sanc-
tioning are more preferred and offer a competitive advantage
over those without [74]. To this end, it is important to estab-
lish guidelines for sanctioning, both internal and external to
specific teams, which discourage parasitic coauthorship and
other bad behaviors that are particular to team settings. Bring-
ing these issues to light may be the first step to establishing a
more ethically conscious scientist. However, providing so-
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TABLE I: Summary statistics for the journal and patent datasets an-
alyzed. The exponential growth rate τ (per year) is estimated using
ordinary least squares regression; the standard error is enclosed in
parentheses. Multiply growth rates by a factor of 100 to obtain the
percentage growth.
Articles / Team size
Dataset Years Patents growth rate τ
Cell 1978 – 2012 11,637 0.035(1)
14 Economics journals 1958 – 2012 36,466 0.013(1)
New England J. Medicine 1958 – 2012 18,347 0.040(3)
Physical Review Letters 1958 – 2012 98,739 0.045(4)
European Patent Office 1974 – 2008 2,207,204 0.011(1)
Patent Cooperation Treaty 1979 – 2008 1,695,339 0.018(2)
lutions to the problems raised here will be challenging since
monitoring ethical standards and sanctioning misbehavior is
difficult in large team endeavors due to the transparency prob-
lem.
An insidious problem highlighted is how a large team en-
vironment may hinder the cross-generational transmission of
values from mentor to mentee, undermining the building of
virtuous academic characters. Over time this may lead to
gradual erosion of ethical standards across science. To fill
the gap, there is need for policies that aim to cultivate moral-
ity. Such policies should promote a bottom-up educational
approach with emphasis on humanistic values, starting with a
student’s first introduction to science in secondary school. In
a very general sense, cultivation of team science ethical val-
ues should become a corollary of the longstanding scientific
method.
A body of ethical scientists is indeed an invaluable
community resource since the support of social norms is
a self-reinforcing process, gaining strength with adoption
size. This is a virtuous cycle to which we are likely to fall
if we address the emerging team science issues early. The
alternative is a vicious cycle that we should aspire to avoid.
Data & Methods
Publication and patent collaboration data. Publication data
for the journals Cell, the New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM), Physical Review Letters (PRL), and 14 top eco-
nomics journals, American Economic Review, Econometrica,
Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Theory,
Journal of Econometrics, Journal of Financial Economics,
Journal of Finance, Journal of Economic Growth, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Journal of Economic Literature,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic
Studies, Review of Financial Studies, Review of Economics
and Statistics, were downloaded from Thomson Reuters
Web of Knowledge for the 55-year period 1958–2012. For
the natural science journals we restricted our analysis to
publications denoted as “Articles”, which excludes reviews,
letters to editor, corrections, and other content types. For
the economics publications we restricted our analysis to the
publication types: “Articles,” “Reviews” and “Proceedings
Papers”. We obtained the patent data from the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [75]:
Years 1974 – 2008 for European Patent Office (EPO) patents
and 1979 – 2008 for Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patents.
We obtained the NSF Science and Engineering Indicators
data from [21–23, 41].
International collaboration network data. Article collab-
orations are tabulated using a whole-count basis whereby
a country is counted only once per paper even if there are
multiple affiliations with a given country address. Article
data from Thomson Reuters Web of Science covers journals
indexed in Science Citation Index and Social Sciences
Citation Index. Country abbreviations are: United States
(US), Germany (GM), United Kingdom (UK), France (FR),
Canada (CA), Japan (JA), Italy (IT), Russia (RS), Netherlands
(NL), Switzerland (SZ), Sweden (SW), Spain (SP), Australia
(AS), Belgium (BE), China (CH), Poland (PL), Israel (IS),
Denmark (DA), Austria (AU), Brazil (BR), Finland (FI),
India (IN), Norway (NO), South Korea (KS), Hungary (HU),
Czech Republic (EZ), Mexico (MX), Taiwan (TW), Greece
(GR), New Zealand (NZ) Argentina (AR), South Africa
(SF), Portugal (PO), Ireland (EI), Chile (CI), Turkey (TU),
Singapore (SN), Iran (IR).
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